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Mr. President: The honour of being in­
vited from another country to be Guest 
Speaker at your Annual Congress imposes 
certain obligations. To mark my apprecia­
tion of this great honour I have decided 
not to choose my topic from my speciality 
— which, after all, can be of interest to only 
a few— but to devote my time to a subject 
which is important to you all, no matter 
what branch of Medicine you profess. If 
we regard ours as a learned profession we 
must be sure that our reasoning is as cogent 
as that of other scientists, and that such 
knowledge as we gain is imparted with 
precision.
A heart specialist recently published his 
observations on the manner in which patients 
sat down in his consulting room. To sit 
down and lean back was termed “ sitting 
at ease” ; all other methods, including draw­
ing the chair forward and leaning on the 
desk, were termed “ ill at ease.”  The author 
then observed how patients sat when there 
was no intervening desk, making the com­
parison under conditions which he thought 
were adequately controlled. He found a 
far larger proportion sitting “ at ease”  and 
he treated his figures by an approved 
statistical method to show that this difference 
was significant. The paper now took on an 
appearance of great scientific respectability, 
being seasoned with such expressions as 
X2=36.8  and P— 0.001. But what the
author forgot, and what you will by now 
be asking, was a simple question: “ What 
happened to that group of patients who would 
have leaned forward on the desk when there 
was no desk to lean on?”  As there was 
no mention of subjects falling flat on their 
faces, under the new conditions, we must 
assume that they adopted some other way
* An Address delivered at the Annual Congress of the Southern 
Rhodesia Mediral Association, Umtali, September, 1954,
of sitting down, possibly including “ sitting 
at ease.”  Thus at least some of the increase 
in “ sitting at ease”  when the desk was re­
moved may have been due to factors which 
the author neglected. Hence his conclusion, 
that the presence of a desk between physician 
and patient may make the latter feel ill at 
ease, lacks any convincing support. It may 
be correct, but he has not proved this and 
the use of statistical methods to analyse his 
unreliable data is one of the ways in which 
statistical methods become discredited among 
the less enlightened.
This elementary example of faulty reason­
ing is only one of many that can be found 
by anyone who reads medical literature with 
a critical eye. It will be missed if, as often 
happens, only the summary of the article is 
read or if the article itself is read too hastily.
It has led me to consider other common 
fallacies in medical writing and to describe 
the ways in which the reader is most com­
monly confused or misled. Let me state 
immediately that these harsh words are not 
directed against the authors’  good faith, for 
most of them seem to be sincere; but many 
of them are obviously persons of poor 
general education who show, in particular, 
the need for instruction in elementary logic.
I shall not labour this point, to which I first 
drew attention nearly twenty years ago 
(Loewenthal, 1936), but I hope to convince 
you of its truth as I proceed.
Language
Many authors seem to believe that the 
use of long words adds to the scientific value 
of their contributions. Perhaps it is only 
from a desire to impress, • perhaps from more 
sinister motives: whatever the cause, the 
result is deplorable, and we often find the 
simplest thoughts so disguised in verbiage 
that they become almost unrecognisable. 
The earliest symptoms of this disease are 
the tendency to use foreign equivalents of 
English words; thus “ belly”  becomes 
“ abdomen,”  “ I have a pain in the neck”  
becomes “ the patient complains of acute 
cervical discomfort”  and instead of being 
in bed or unable to get up, the patient is
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gratified to find that he is “ nonambulant.”  
Granted that at the bedside they may be 
necessary in order to prevent the patient 
understanding much of what is being dis­
cussed, nevertheless the use of these ugly 
phrases at other times is apt to give the 
lover of English an acute cervical discomfort. 
It may be urged that many such expressions 
provide an economy of phrase; this may be 
true of some, but certainly not of others: 
what advantage, for instance, can be claimed 
for the horrible “ prior to hospitalisation”  
over “ before admission?”
I recently saw a newspaper report dealing 
with the need for simplicity in psychological 
language (presumably the language used by 
psychologists was meant). The following 
was given as an example: “ Mary was 
relatively retarded on digital manipulation 
in vacuo”  and this, according to a clinic 
worker, meant that “ Mary could not waggle 
her thumb very well.”
Lest these objections be thought trivial 
let me remind you that the purpose of 
language is to convey thought; when the 
attent'on becomes fixed on trying to decipher 
a message, it is apt to be distracted from 
the content. Consciously or unconsciously 
misdirection— the stand-by of the conjuror 
— creeps in. While our attention is fixed 
on the right hand, firing a pistol or words 
of five syllables, the left is producing a bowl 
of goldfish— or a belief disguised as a fact. 
When people itch and scratch because they 
are upset and someone tries to help them 
by attacking the cause of their upset, the 
results should make interesting reading; but 
when these results are produced as 
“ Dynamically-Oriented Brief Psychotherapy: 
Psychocutaneous Excoriation Syndromes,”  I, 
for one, am so exhausted by translating the 
title into English that I have little energy 
left for a critical review of the contents. 
In this particular paper, as a matter of fact, 
there is no real evidence that the itching 
and scratching were wholly or partly of 
emotional origin. We shall meet this type 
of conjuring trick again when the fallacy 
of petitio principii is considered.
Much more could be said about words 
and the secondary meanings they have 
acquired. The use of “ significant”  can, for 
instance, be quite misleading. This word 
has a particular meaning when applied to 
the statistical treatment of observed facts: 
its use in other circumstances, for instance 
in such sentences as “ Significant improve- 
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ment was noted,”  is of course not illegal, 
but it may imply more than it states. Words 
also have their changing fashions: Benjamin 
(1952) has recently pointed out the un­
popularity of “ dichotomy”  (a perfectly res­
pectable form of classification) and “ un­
dynamic”  in psychotherapeutic circles. To 
make good to-day you and your methods 
must be dynamic, just as a sewing machine 
must be streamlined, even if it is not going 
to move at sixty miles an hour against a 
headwind. Beware, then, of words which 
imply more than they state; distrust the 
facile “ therefore”  and the presumptuous 
“ significant”  and regard with suspicion those 
conclusions which are said to “ follow 
logically”  from the observed facts. It is long 
odds that the author’s knowledge of logic 
is no greater than his readers.
Logical Lapses
Logic has been defined as the science of 
thought (Creighton, 1910 a ) ; thought is a 
skilled job and, to give the best results, 
must be studied and practised as thoroughly 
as other skilled occupations, from Music to 
Medicine. Though commonsense is, accord­
ing to popular belief, all that is needed 
in everyday life its exclusive use in the 
sciences is apt to lead the observer astray. 
Certain rules of thinking have been evolved 
over the last two and a half thousand years; 
they have withstood the test of time, and, 
with few exceptions, still serve to direct the 
processes cf valid thinking. These rules 
comprise Deductive and Inductive Logic. 
The former attempts to deduce particular 
items of truth from universally accepted 
ones; the latter to increase the sum of 
human knowledge by deriving universal 
truths from a collection of specific examples. 
When you inform the patient’s relatives of 
the hopeless outlook in a case of malignant 
melanoma with widespread secondaries, you 
are unconsciously using deductive logic; all 
cases of malignant melanoma with widespread 
secondaries are known to die of the disease; 
this is such a case. Therefore this patient 
will die of the disease. The possible fallacy 
that death may occur earlier from some 
other cause, such as suicide, is irrelevant 
here. You have deduced a specific truth 
from a general one.
Inductive logic is more generally used by 
the research worker. From a specific number 
of instances he attempts to frame a general 
law, or a universal truth. Thus an observer 
who has encountered several cases of pig-
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men ted cutaneous tumours giving rise to 
secondary pigmented tumours and invariably 
causing death may feel confident that such 
cases carry a poor prognosis. When he 
reads that from Laennec’s day, all other 
observers have had the same experience and 
that the tumour has a characteristic his­
tological structure known as that of malignant 
melanoma, he may then formulate a law: 
“ that malignant melanoma with widespread 
secondaries is a fatal disease.”  You will 
recollect that it was from this law that the 
prognosis in a given case was deduced.
Now it is obvious that the great bulk of 
medical discovery and the vast majority of 
clinical diagnoses are made by men and 
women who have not the slightest knowledge 
of the rules of formal logic. Why then, 
you will ask, should a knowledge of logic 
be desirable? I could answer that quite 
a few discoveries and diagnoses are unsound 
and would not have been made by persons 
trained in the habit of logical thinking. 
This, however, is not my primary object. I 
propose instead to demonstrate how a know­
ledge of formal logic may so assist the 
critical faculty as to help in assessing the 
value of scientific and pseudo-scientific 
articles.
One of the principal branches of Logic 
is the study of fallacies, both in deductive 
and inductive reasoning. Originally they 
were no doubt described and classified as an 
aid to confounding one’s opponent in a 
battle of dialectic, but since then their study 
has been extended. A  fallacy is an error 
of reasoning (or of interpretation) and 
familiarity with the commoner fallacies is 
desirable— I almost said essential— in the 
critical study of any article which presents 
a reasoned conclusion. This obviously com­
prises the greater part of medical literature. 
Time does not permit me to classify even the 
commoner fallacies, nor to include examples 
of the majority. I. shall, however, submit 
a few instances taken from recent articles, 
purely as illustrations. No reflection is made 
on the possible excellence of such articles; 
the facts presented may be of great im­
portance and the conclusions may still be 
correct, even though they have been derived 
by faulty reasoning.
The first class of fallacy, which follows 
naturally from the earlier part of this essay, 
derives from the use of Ambiguous Language. 
An amusing example of Jevons’ is often 
quoted (Creighton, 1910 b ) : it occurs in
Chapter XIII of the First Book of Kings, 
verse 27, where it is said of the prophet: 
“ And he spake to his sons, saying, ‘Saddle 
me the ass.’ And they saddled him ”  The 
italics indicate that the word him was 
supplied by the translators, but a very 
different meaning may be suggested. A 
modern example is of far greater importance. 
There is a class of drugs which act as anta­
gonists of histamine. The liberation of 
histamine is one of the consequences of 
some, but not all, forms of allergic reaction; 
thus the symptoms and signs of urticaria, 
when due to the liberation of histamine (or 
a similar substance) may frequently be sup­
pressed by these drugs. Quite incorrectly, 
these drugs, first called “ anti-histaminic,”  
have come to be called “ anti-allergic”  and 
are to-day used in enormous quantity for 
any condition which is thought to be allergic 
in nature. As far as skin diseases are con­
cerned, it has repeatedly been shown (Warin, 
1954) that such drugs are effective only 
when there is wealing; nevertheless they are 
constantly being prescribed for other forms 
of irritating skin disease, such as the 
eczematous reaction, in which there is no 
wealing and in which the liberation of his­
tamine plays no part.
A second and similar type of fallacy now 
comes into view. Some forms of eczema 
are known to be produced by an allergic 
mechanism, particularly the contact der­
matitis which may follow exposure to plants, 
cosmetics and chemicals; other eczemas, such 
as the variety associated with asthma and 
hay fever, are at least partly dependent on 
an allergic mechanism. But there is no 
justification for the belief that all eczemas 
are of allergic origin. Nevertheless it is 
commonly accepted that “ eczema”  implies 
“ allergy”  and, through the fallacy just ex­
plained, “ allergy”  calls for anti-histaminic 
drugs.
Ignoratio Elenchi. The fallacy of Irre­
levant Conclusion is one of the most prolific 
weeds in the garden of medical literature. 
Instead of proving what you have set out 
to prove, you demonstrate some other con­
clusion which is more or less nearly related.
An excellent example is taken from the 
Lancet’s report of Question Time in Parlia­
ment (1954). It concerns the Minister’s 
failure to re-appoint Dr. Stark Murray to 
a certain Hospital Board. He was asked 
the following question: “ Can the Minister 
assure the House that political considerations
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did not enter into this, since Dr. Stark 
Murray is a leading Socialist doctor and his 
successor is a leading anti-Socialist doctor?”  
The reply was: “ If the hon. Member looks 
at not one instance, but at all the instances, 
and at other boards, he will know that there 
is no foundation for his suggestion.”  Here 
is Ignoratio Elenchi at its best. The Minister 
is asked about Dr. Stark Murray and bases 
his reply on every other instance, but not 
on the case of Dr. Stark Murray. Should 
you still feel that the Minister’s reply, if 
technically illogical, was a reasonable one, 
then consider the matter in this way: suppose 
that there was a movement on foot to get 
rid of socialists occupy.ng important posts. 
Then obviously the movement must begin by 
getting rid of one socialist, and the fact that 
the authorities have not yet got round to 
dismissing the others is quite irrelevant.
The Irrelevant Conclusion is also seen 
when personalities are introduced into a dis­
cussion (argumentum ad hominem) ; an 
oft-quoted example is that of the lawyer 
who was handed a brief marked: “ We have 
no case; abuse plaintiffs attorney.” In 
medical writing this form of the fallacy is 
rarely seen— possibly because of editorial 
watchfulness— but it may be thinly disguised, 
as in the following example. A physiologist 
described the changes produced in the gastric 
secretion of dogs subjected to certain un­
pleasant experiences under controlled con­
ditions. This stimulated an investigator tc 
publish a paper in which the physiologist’s 
experiments and conclusions are severely 
criticised. I am quite unfit to pass an opinion 
on the merits of the case and I have quoted 
it only to point out some fallacies of the 
investigator: the one we are concerned with 
here is the phrase, “ During the so-called 
‘experimental periods’ . . .”  Now why
“ so-called?”  The experiments, as described 
by the physiologist, may have been good or 
bad, adequate or inadequate, humane or in­
human; but they certainly were experiments 
and the use of the adjective “ so-called”  can 
have no other purpose than to arouse pre­
judice against their performer.
The Irrelevant Conclusion is also seen in 
attempts to transfer the onus of proof, rarely 
in medical literature, but frequently in argu­
ments and clinical discussions. Here, in 
effect, the man who cannot prove his point 
takes refuge in a challenge such as “ If you 
maintain that I am wrong, prove it.”  This 
fallacy is often difficult to detect in the heat
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of argument, obvious though it may be to 
the logician. It is so common that Todd 
(1951) even found it necessary to write an 
article entitled: “ The onus of proving the 
value of remedies” ; the conclusion was that 
“ the advocates, not the opposers, of all 
remedies should supply proof of their claims.”
Petitio Principii, or “ Begging the Question”  
is also one of the commoner fallacies. It 
is first necessary to point out that Begging 
the Question has nothing to do with Evading 
the Question, though it is commonly misused 
in this sense. There are so many ways in 
which this fallacy can be perpetrated that I 
propose giving a few concrete examples 
rather than dilating on the various sub-heads 
into which it may be classified.
First we may consider the question­
begging epithet. If prosecuting counsel 
refers to the accused as “ this bloodthirsty 
individual”  (a procedure which is permitted 
in certain countries) he obviously assumes 
the guilt of the accused— the very point that 
he is trying to prove. In much the same 
way an author, setting out to prove the 
emotional or nervous origin of a skin con­
dition, may call it “ neuro-dermatitis,”  or 
group a number of conditions under the title 
“ the neurodermatoses.”  I referred earlier 
in this paper to the use of popular and un­
popular words in medicine or, rather, in 
psychosomatic medicine. You will now 
appreciate that the adjectives “ dynamic”  or 
“ undynamic”  can become question-begging 
epithets, expressing approval or disapproval 
while the subject is still under consideration.
A more complex form of Petitio Principii 
is of frequent occurrence in medical 
literature: this is known as “ reasoning in a 
circle.”  A non-medical example given by 
Creighton (1910 c) will make it clear: “ I 
should not do this act, because it is wrong.”  
“ But how do you know that the act is 
wrong?”  “ Why, because I know that I 
should not do it.”  When we turn to medical 
literature this variety of begging the question 
is often found, as for instance in the following 
example:—•
A group of clinicians wanted to find out 
whether emotional factors played any part in 
the occurrence of extrasystoles. They took 
12 unselected patients and found that “ extra­
systoles and associated anxiety were observed 
in these subjects experimentally during a 
discussion of topics to which they were 
known to be sensitive or which had previously 
been associated with extrasystoles.”  This,
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then, is the conclusion. Now let us turn 
back to Case 3, a hypertensive woman of 51. 
During a discussion about her mother, during 
which the patient showed no obvious anxiety, 
a shower of extrasystoles occurred. I quote 
the last sentence of this clinical record: “ The 
patient stated that she had not thought the 
topics discussed disturbing to her but they 
evidently touched on matters to which she 
was sensitive.”  (My own italics.) Why 
“ evidently?”  Apparently because they were 
accompanied by an attack of extrasystoles, 
and the authors have concluded that extra­
systoles are produced by emotional factors. 
Hence in Case 3 they have assumed the con­
clusion which they set out to prove.
I trust that you will not be led astray by 
my frequent use of examples from psycho­
somatic medicine, and commit the fallacy 
of supposing that all such studies are fal­
lacious. It is true, indeed, that I have found 
it easier to demonstrate false reasoning in 
the writings of psychiatrists than in those 
of other specialists; but this must not lead 
us to the next fallacy which I shall discuss, 
that of False Generalisation. In other words, 
from the few examples I have submitted, you 
must not conclude that all psychiatric studies 
employ logical fallacies, nor that all 
psychiatrists dispense with the accepted rules 
of reasoning. A notable illustration can be 
found in a recent article by Macalpine (1954) 
who, herself a psychiatrist, exposes the fallacy 
of Petitio Principii as often perpetrated by 
other psychiatrists: “ Again, some workers 
start off with the assumption that emotional 
factors are responsible for a given condition: 
patients are then investigated to this end, 
and when such emotional factors or conflicts 
are found the conclusion is drawn that the 
original premise was correct, the aetiological 
conclusions and definitions follow accord­
ingly. A circular argument is thus intro­
duced and continued.”  Precisely, you will 
observe, as happened in the episode of the 
extrasystoles.
This fallacy of False Generalisation is 
constantly seen in various guises. It is com­
mitted whenever conclusions are drawn from 
an insufficient number of observations, and 
thus provides one of the many bridges 
between Logic and Statistics. It is also com­
mitted whenever we neglect exceptions and 
base a universal rule on an overwhelming 
number of instances. Thus it is to-day 
customary to regard emotional factors as
the only cause of peptic ulcer, though we 
know that in rare cases other forms of stress 
— systemic or local— may be incriminated, 
with equal justification. “ The exception 
proves the rule”  say the ignorant, not know­
ing that “ proves”  in this context means 
“ tests”  (Latin: probare), and that where 
there is an exception there can be no rule.
As an amusing example of where faulty 
generalisation can lead us, let me take you 
back to this question of peptic ulcer. I have 
no specialised knowledge with which to argue 
the question as to whether peptic ulcers are 
invariably a psychosomatic disease. What 
I know is that there are people who still 
hold that these ulcers may arise from other 
causes, such as faulty diet. Now take this 
paragraph from the summary of a paper 
which I mentioned earlier: “ The development 
of this syndrome in young calves pre­
maturely weaned, and the relief of these 
ulcers hy permitting the calves to continue 
on a milk diet, provides striking evidence 
for the correctness of the psychoanalytic 
theory of ulcer formation.”  Although the 
author has stated earlier (in a footnote) that 
the fodder may also be an important factor, 
he relegates it to a subsidiary place. You 
see now where the original fallacy has led: 
by formulating a law through False Generali­
sation he cannot admit of an exception; 
hence 98% of weaned calves, between the 
ages of 12 and 14 weeks, must be showing 
the effects of mother rejection or some other 
alteration in cow-calf relationship. The in­
fluence of a third party is not mentioned 
but I feel there is quite a lot of bull around 
too.
Inductive Logic, or the use of observed 
instances to provide a universal rule, is by 
its very nature subject to numerous fallacies. 
The whole question of Cause and Effect, 
which we cannot now explore, is but one 
instance of its scope. But for those who 
wish to reflect on the subject, I recommend 
the study of three sets of rules, in their 
diminishing order of exactness: first, we have 
Koch’s Postulates for incriminating a germ 
suspected of causing a certain disease; next, 
we have the slightly less rigid, but still exact­
ing, conditions under which a substance may 
be blamed for provoking an allergic reaction; 
and lastly we have the criteria by which an 
illness is to-day considered to be of psychic 
origin. I regret that time does not allow 
a closer examination of these and similar 
problems; a few examples will have to in-
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dicate the importance of this field, as well 
as its vastness.
If one fact obtains, and another invariably 
follows, it is often expressed concisely as 
“ if p, then q.”  For example, if a person 
has syphilis, then his blood shows a positive 
Wassermann reaction. Now a very common 
fallacy is to reason thus: “ but q obtains, 
therefore p is true,”  or, to take our example 
further, “ this patient has a positive Wasser­
mann reaction, therefore he has syphilis.” 
To an audience accustomed to yaws and 
njovera, let alone biologically false positive 
reactions, such a statement sounds ridiculous. 
Yet I can assure you that it forms the basis 
of diagnosis in many cases. Even two 
workers, who recently investigated positive 
serological reactions in South African natives 
and doubted whether positive tests were in 
fact evidence of syphilis, persistently refer 
to their serological results as the “ syphilitic 
rate.”
When we enter the field of Cause and 
Effect, closer study is a continual source 
of worry to the intellectually honest. Reflect, 
for instance, on the history of human 
malaria: originally residence in swampy 
regions was considered to be an adequate 
explanation; later the parts played by the 
plasmodium and its insect vector were 
assumed to have solved the problem. Later 
still the case of the symptomless carrier of 
the parasite had to be explained, and still 
more recently the effect of diet on sus­
ceptibility to the disease. Thus, in Medicine 
at least, the demonstration of a single cause 
or an invariable effect is no longer a matter 
for serious search. If a man is run over 
by a bus we do our best to repair his broken 
bones and crushed tissues; but even in a 
case as straightforward as this we should, 
in the consideration of cause and effect, take 
note of such factors as accident proneness 
and occupational fatigue. You have all, I 
am sure, become aware of the growing 
interest in a connection between cigarette 
smoking and cancer of the lung. The 
statistical work, retrospective and prospective, 
of Doll and Hill (1954) leave one in no 
doubt that the heavy smoker shows an in­
creased liability to cancer of the lung; but 
no thinking person, least of all such meti­
culous workers as Doll and Hill, would be 
satisfied that the problem of cause and effect 
had been solved in its entirety. Not only has 
the question of multiple causation to be 
considered, but the tempting leap from
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statistical evidence to the incrimination of 
tobacco tar must be viewed with caution. 
For cigarette smoking connotes not only 
the inhalation of tobacco smoke, but that 
of paper, added matter, chemicals that may 
have been used on the tobacco plant and 
even, as you well know in this country, the 
fumes of petrol lighters.
One of the better known fallacies in 
Inductive Logic is that of False Cause, or 
“ post hoc ergo propter hoc.”  If one event 
follows another, even with some regularity, 
we cannot, without further evidence, consider 
the first to be the cause of the second, for in 
that case we should have to allow that day 
is the cause of night. If, then, a young 
woman tells you that her acne is always worse 
when she is emotionally upset it is unwise 
to conclude that the state of her skin is 
necessarily the result of her psychic state. 
Both are more probably the result of endo­
crine changes with water retention, frequently 
present during the week before the menstrual 
period. Similarly, I have described the case 
(Loewenthal, 1954) of a young woman with 
recurrent inflammation of the eyelids. This 
happened only when she suffered from a bout 
of depression and psychiatric treatment was 
given in vain. Much later it was discovered 
that she used to fly to the cosmetician when­
ever she felt an attack of depression was 
imminent and at these times, and at no 
others, a coating of nail lacquer was applied. 
Patch tests showed a positive result and she 
has had no further attacks of eczema since 
giving up nail lacquer, though her periodic 
depression still recurs. Remember that the 
statement “ This patient’s rash got better on 
calcium”  means only what it says, that is 
that his rash got better while he was on 
calcium; it is usually impossible to establish 
firmly any causal relationship between the 
administration of a drug and the improve­
ment noted in a single instance. Only when 
a series is studied with adequate controls 
can conclusions be tentatively mooted. I 
commend to you therefore the scepticism of 
the Trobriand Islanders, who could not be 
persuaded that the birth of a child was the 
result of what had happened nine months 
before.
Misuse of Figures
Fifteen years ago, when Wilson and I were 
preparing a paper on statistical methods in 
Medicine (Loewenthal and Wilson, 1939), 
we had no difficulty in finding examples of 
conclusions wrongly drawn from figures
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presented. To-day the importance of 
statistical methods is more widely realised 
and few papers present their conclusions 
without some statistical adornment. This 
usually takes the form of a test which pur­
ports to show how often such an agreement 
or discrepancy would occur through chance 
alone. If once in twenty trials, the probability 
(P ) is 5 per cent., or 0.05; if once in a 
hundred trials, P is 1 per cent, or 0.01 and 
the statistical significance is judged according 
to this figure. The working out of these 
statistics calls for no more mathematical 
knowledge than is imparted to most school­
boys, so that many medical research workers 
perform their own statistical tricks. It often 
happens, however, that their lack of the 
necessary training prompts them to employ 
unsuitable data or inappropriate tests, hence 
their efforts may remind one of the trained 
chimpanzee circling the stage on a bicycle—  
admirable as a spectacle but without getting 
their performer to any destination.
Other workers invite the help of trained 
statisticians, with satisfactory results, always 
provided that the statistician understands the 
problem and has had a voice in planning the 
experiment. For when he is simply presented 
with a series of figures and asked to cal­
culate their significance, his labours cannot 
possibly cancel out errors committed in the 
assembling of those figures. He cannot, in 
fact, make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear. 
The ideal arrangement, of course, is for 
the research worker to be a competent 
statistician, as in the case of Doll and Hill, 
and there is no real reason why medical 
research workers should not be so trained. 
But whoever does the statistical work, it 
must be clearly understood that no refinement 
of mathematics can compensate for faulty 
or indefinite data, as I tried to show in the 
example at the beginning of this paper. This 
use, or rather misuse, of mathematics was 
well described by Macaulay, when he referred 
to the man who uses statistics as a drunkard 
uses a lamp-post— for support and not for 
enlightenment. Before we turn to the figures 
themselves, therefore, and before considering 
how they may be added, subtracted, mul­
tiplied, divided and generally have the square 
roots battered out of them, let us examine 
some of the mistakes that can be made in 
their collection.
White (1953) has recently given a timely 
reminder of the possible fallacies in the 
selection of samples for study. We all know
that there is an error inherent in the selection 
of a sample that is too small and therefore 
unlikely to be representative; but the con­
verse is by no means a solution, in spite of 
the popular misconception that the study 
of larger and larger series will of necessity 
bring us nearer to the truth. White has 
given evidence of two large-scale experiments 
which turned out to be quite useless as the 
result of biassed sampling, that is the selec­
tion of a large series which was not typical 
of the population as a whole. The use of 
controls is therefore a subject which calls for 
more care and knowledge than is usually 
given to it.
An actual example will make some of 
these difficulties clearer. Two doctors 
attempted to assess the connection between 
certain skin diseases and psychic factors such 
as Personality Disorder and Emotional Stress. 
First, a random sample was obtained by 
selecting every fifth case at Skin Out-Patients 
for psychiatric investigation. Here then, is 
the first possible fallacy, that the whole 
sample, which includes controls, was drawn 
from a hospital out-patient clinic. We do 
not know whether Personality Disorder and 
Emotional Stress in a “ random”  sample of 
out-patients is at all comparable with con­
ditions obtaining among the general popula­
tion; the authors, in fact, postulate that an 
out-patient clinic must contain a larger pro­
portion of psychically abnormal people and 
hence, with commendable honesty, draw 
attention to their own sampling error.
Next we must consider a possible source of 
error which I have not yet mentioned: 
conscious or unconscious bias in . the mind 
of the observer. In order to obviate this it 
would have been helpful if the psychiatrist 
had been in ignorance of the dermatologist’ s 
diagnosis, for a patient presenting with the 
label “ neurodermatitis”  could not help in­
fluencing any psychiatrist who was also a 
normal, fallible human being. Unfortunately 
there is no mention of this point and we 
have no means of telling how much the 
psychiatrist had gathered about the patient's 
skin complaint.
The results of this investigation were sur­
prising, for the group of skin diseases which 
one would normally use as controls— varicose 
dermatitis, naevi, rodent ulcer, xanthomatosis 
and so on— showed a high proportion of 
psychically abnormal subjects. As I have 
said before, this was explained as being due 
to sampling errors just short of the point
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where it could be said that a man must be 
crazy to attend a skin out-patient clinic. 
There are, however, other explanations which 
depend on the answer to certain questions. 
What is the degree of accuracy, or what is the 
margin cf error, in results obtained by the 
psychiatric interview? Does this psychiatrist 
usually obtain results comparable with those 
of other psychiatrists? From the studies 
presented by other investigators, are we 
justified in accepting as a fact that certain 
dermatoses are linked with psychic ab­
normality and, further, that they are the 
result of such abnormality? I believe that 
many of the discrepancies found so fre­
quently in the results of different investigators 
could be obviated if more attention were 
paid to the important and fundamental prob­
lem of sampling.
Let us assume that the results of an enquiry 
have been collected with due regard to the 
exigencies of sampling, including adequate 
controls. The next possible source of error 
lies in the tricks which may be played with 
these figures.
The illegitimate use of percentages comes 
readily to mind. It is a useful device and 
a perfectly proper one, when several unequal 
series of more than 100 examples in each 
are to be compared. It is even permissible 
when some of the series comprise some 70 
or 80 examples. But where are we going 
to draw the line? A recent paper on various 
methods of treating hypertension provides 
a good example. Here the series vary from 
43 patients to 4 and whereas in the former 
a response in 20 can, with some justification, 
be characterised as 47%, in the latter a 
response in one patient should hardly be 
regarded as a 25% response. Surely the 
assumption that, if one patient in four res­
ponds, then 25 will respond in every 100 is 
an example of the fallacy of False Generalisa­
tion. Look at it in this way if you are in 
doubt; a second series of 4 might well show 
a response in none without causing surprise, 
and a third series might similarly show a 
response in two; but the percentage figure 
would now vary between 0 and 50 and would 
obviously be useless for purposes of com­
parison. I have even seen a table in which 
1 out of 1 was solemnly entered as 100%. 
Earlier in this paper I mentioned the con­
juror’s trick of misdirection; this one must 
surely rank as the Indian Rope Trick of 
medical writing.
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Let me now use the few minutes that 
remain to consider the question of statistical 
devices applied to figures which have been 
arbitrarily derived. There are many 
phenomena in medical work which cannot be 
directly expressed in numbers; thus, whereas 
a series of red blood cell estimations can 
be directly entered in a numerical table, the 
severity of the symptoms of anaemia do not 
admit of similar treatment. In the one case 
we have a quantitative estimate in the other 
a qualitative one. Now the branch of 
statistics which I am discussing is concerned 
with the examination of figures, not the 
examination of attributes unless these latter 
are so sharply defined as to give a definite 
“ yes or no”  answer. Thus it is permissible 
to classify a series of cases according to the 
presence or absence of fits, but further clas­
sification into “ severe,” “ moderate” and so 
on is permissible only if some numerical 
criterion is introduced; in this way we 
could separate those patients with ten or 
more fits a day from those with a smaller 
number. But there are cases in which no 
such numerical division can be used. As 
Yule (1922) says, “ The division may also 
be vague and uncertain: sanity and insanity, 
sight and blindness, pass into each other by 
such fine gradations that judgments may 
differ as to the class in which a given in­
dividual should be entered.”  Thus figures 
which rely only on the observer’s judgment 
are of a low standard of accuracy, for other 
observers may well give a different assess­
ment of the qualities under review. It follows 
that the use of delicate statistical methods 
to analyse such figures is fundamentally un­
sound for, as I remarked before, no refine­
ment of mathematics can compensate for 
faulty or indefinite data.
A single, last example will suffice. In 
the paper I referred to, entitled “ Dynamically- 
Oriented Brief Psychotherapy: Psycho- 
cutaneous Excoriation Syndromes,”  the 
author devotes a footnote to explaining how 
standard deviations and standard errors were 
derived and how the values of “ t”  were 
obtained— all according to normal practice. 
But when we turn to some of the figures 
which form the raw material of these cal­
culations, we find the following: “ For 
statistical purposes motivation for therapy 
was rated according to an arbitrary scale 
in which poor motivation was scored 1, fair 
2, good 3, and excellent 4.”  I take this 
to mean that patients who showed no eager­
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ness for treatment only scored one point, 
while those who were as keen as mustard 
scored four, but I am at a loss to decide how 
the intermediate gradations were determined. 
You have only to remember the gross differ­
ences observed when different examiners give 
marks for the same examination papers in 
order to realise that Seitz’s figures are 
not of the kind upon which statistical analyses 
should be based. Nor does the employment 
of impressive words such as “ assessment”  
and “ evaluation”  add one jot of precision 
to an indefinite concept.
Conclusion
This reference to bad language as a dis­
guise for' faulty methods brings us back 
to our starting point. I have drawn atten­
tion to some of the pitfalls in the path of 
the trusting reader of medical literature. 
Where I have given illustrations of what I 
consider to be faulty language, logic or 
calculation, I have tried to do so in the
spirit of Abraham Lincoln: “ With malice 
toward none; with charity for all.”  And 
if I have fallen short of this ideal I hope 
at least to have followed Pope’s precept, to 
“ Laugh where we must, be candid where 
we can,
But vindicate the ways of God to man.”
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